Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation? by Choi, Stephen J. et al.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827189 
Draft: March 21, 2017 
1 
Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation? 
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott* 
Abstract 
Standard contract doctrine presumes that sophisticated contracting parties choose their 
terminology carefully because they want courts or counterparts to understand the precise 
meaning they intend to convey. The implication of this “rational design” model of commercial 
contracting behavior is that courts should (and do) pay close attention to the plain or ordinary 
meaning of the language in a standardized term and interpret observed changes in terminology as 
embodying new meaning that varies from the original formulation. Using a study of the 
sovereign bond market, we examine the rational design model as applied to standard-form 
contracting. In NML v. Argentina, federal courts in New York attached great weight  to the 
precise phrasing of the boilerplate contract terms at issue. The industry promptly condemned the 
decision for endorsing a supposedly erroneous interpretation of a variant of a hoary boilerplate 
clause.  Utilizing data on how contracting practices responded to the courts’ decisions, we ask 
whether the market response indicates that parties in fact intended the variations in their standard 
contract language to embody different meanings. We find the data supports a model of the 
evolution of boilerplate language that is much closer to random mutation rather than rational 
design. 
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I. Introduction 
 
NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina is perhaps the most important case in the history of 
the sovereign debt markets.  The core of the case was a dispute over the meaning of the pari 
passu clause in the Republic of Argentina’s bond covenants—a contract term that almost no one 
in the markets seemed to understand (Gelpern 2016).  Despite the lack of market understanding, 
a court in the Southern District of New York (SDNY)  ruled that the particular variant of the pari 
passu clause in Argentina’s bonds had a precise meaning, one that  required the sovereign to 
make “ratable payments” to all bondholders, including those holdouts who had refused to 
participate in Argentina’s debt restructuring.1  
 
Despite the widespread market sentiment that the pari passu term did not mean what the 
SDNY said that it meant, the seemingly aberrant interpretation was affirmed by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the leading commercial court in the United States.2  Both courts, faced 
with what was essentially an evidentiary vacuum about the affirmative meaning of the clause, 
took the standard contract interpretation approach of assuming that variations in the formulation 
of the clause suggested variations in the contractual intentions of the parties.  Using data on how 
market actors reacted to the courts’ interpretive strategy, we examine how well this strategy-- 
that presumed the variations were the product of intentional contract design-- worked to replicate 
the bargain that parties had intended to make. 
 
Our goal in this article is to shed light on a specific question regarding the appropriate 
presumptions for courts to use when interpreting boilerplate language: Do distinct variations in 
the wording of boilerplate clauses necessarily imply differences in meaning, particularly when 
the standard meaning of the clause seems to be largely lost?  Contract doctrine, particularly in 
New York, attaches great importance to the precise language of contract terms based on the 
strong presumption that the use of different words suggest differences in meaning and intent.3  
                                                 
1 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011); NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Argentina, No. 08 Civ 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012). 
2 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2; NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012). 
3 See e.g., Ashwood Capital, Inc. v OTG Mgt., Inc. 99 A.D.3d 1, 948 N.Y.S.2d 292, N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2012,  
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Our study suggests, at least in the case of one subset of boilerplate contracts, that the 
presumption of intentional design may be unwarranted. 
 
Important to our analysis is the premise that there are contract provisions and mutations 
to those provisions in some boilerplate contracts that neither party understands nor intends to 
convey current meaning. Contract doctrine does not contemplate the possibility of such “black 
hole” terms (Choi, Gulati & Scott 2017). We begin, therefore,  with an explanation of how the 
erosion of meaning over time can produce black holes in certain boilerplate contracts.  Erosion of 
meaning can occur in at least two ways (Goetz & Scott 1985). First, some terms are so 
consistently repeated that they become a ritualized incantation and lose their original meaning 
(“rote usage”).  The rote usage problem arises when the meaning of a term is never validated 
through litigation or updated by an industry group. And the problem becomes worse if the clause 
becomes part of the standard “check list” of essential terms that are included without bargaining; 
a phenomenon that accelerates rote usage.  “Encrustation” is a second result of too much 
repetition:  the intelligibility of language deteriorates significantly as legal jargon is overlaid on 
standard linguistic formulations.  Once a term becomes part of the standard check list, 
contracting parties are less motivated to focus on and correct random variations that 
subsequently appear.  
 
How should a court handle variation in the language of standard form contract terms that 
have largely lost an apparent meaning?  As a matter of ordinary contract interpretation, courts are 
instructed to give effect to the ex ante intentions of the parties. Since the contracting parties are 
in the best position to articulate their purposes, presumably their explicit words at the outset of 
the contractual relationship are the best evidence of what they intended.  For example, if a 
contract stipulates that a party must use “ best efforts” rather than an alternative, say, of 
“reasonable efforts,” a court  may assume that they purposely specified “best” rather than 
“reasonable” efforts, and, to the extent possible, give content to that purpose.  The utility of 
                                                                                                                                                             
July 10, 2012 (“According to well-established rules of contract interpretation, ‘when parties set down their 
agreement in a clear, complete document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to its terms’. We 
apply this rule with even greater force in commercial contracts negotiated at arm's length by sophisticated, 
counseled businesspeople … We … concern ourselves ‘with what the parties intended, but only to the extent that 
they evidenced what they intended by what they wrote’." [citations omitted]). 
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courts using this “Rational Design” model of contract interpretation when interpreting certain 
boilerplate language is our starting point.   
 
Against the Rational Design model, we test an alternate “Random Mutation” model that 
assumes linguistic variations in a standard boilerplate term are more often a product of 
uncoordinated efforts to tinker with the standard language  as opposed to intentional efforts to 
tailor the language to achieve a particular meaning.  In this model, boilerplate contracts produced 
for individual deals are not created out of whole cloth.  Instead, drafters copy new deals largely 
from prior deals or industry standard forms (Richman 2011). Even so, marginal modifications to 
the standard form are required to meet the needs of the transaction. Thus, agents charged with the 
drafting responsibility but ignorant of the function of the boilerplate terms tinker with the 
boilerplate language at the margins.  But if parties include these boilerplate terms simply to 
satisfy standard practice and not because they attach independent substantive meaning to the 
terms, then principals are not motivated to monitor the agents’ actions. In this way, the revised 
language evolves as the “new” standard, leading to encrustation. The modified standard is then 
reused in future deals and incorporated into the next generation of boilerplate terms. Under a 
Random Mutation model, it would not be surprising to find terms that become part of the 
standard template and are then repeated over time through rote usage as part of the standard 
package of terms without any attention paid to the original meaning of the terms. This lost 
meaning becomes even more difficult to recover when, through the tinkering process, the terms 
also become encrusted with meaningless legal jargon (Goetz & Scott 1985).   
 
It matters which model a court adopts when interpreting boilerplate terms in commercial 
markets. The Rational Design model might advise a court to give different effect to  “reasonable 
efforts,” “best efforts” and even “reasonable best efforts” variations. By contrast, the Random 
Mutation model advises the court to entertain the possibility that “reasonable efforts,” “best 
efforts” and “reasonable best efforts” variations might all mean the same thing.  Moreover, if the 
boilerplate term at issue has lost meaning, a court charged with resolving an interpretive dispute 
faces an evidentiary vacuum. Here, the likelihood that a court following the Rational Design 
approach will adopt an aberrant interpretation is increased as compared with a boilerplate term 
with known meaning.   
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The pari passu litigation that is the centerpiece of our inquiry raises this issue.  The 
clause, a staple of sovereign bond instruments for over a century, exists today in at least four 
distinct formulations.  The sovereign bonds at issue will alternately rank, with the sovereign’s 
other debt, equally (“Rank Equally”), equally in right of payment (“Rank Equally in Payment”), 
or equally and ratably and be payable as such (“Pay Equally”). In a fourth formulation, the 
sovereign bond instrument includes one of the prior three versions with an addendum “except as 
subject to mandatory law” (termed “Mandatory Law”).  Of these, the Rank Equally version of 
the clause has the oldest vintage (Weidemaier, Scott & Gulati 2013). 
 
In NML v. Argentina the courts suggested that the Rank Equally in Payment clause meant 
something different than the Rank Equally formulation.  In the terms of our project, the question 
for the courts was whether this variation (in particular, the addition of the word “Payment”) 
reflected a random mutation or was the tailored product of rational design. In addition to 
suggesting that the Rank Equally and the Rank Equally in Payment clauses had different 
meanings, the NML courts did something else that aids our analysis: they suggested that the Rank 
Equally in Payment might be the same as (or something close to) the Pay Equally version of the 
clause. So, while the courts rejected the Random Mutation model by giving meaning to the 
difference in wording between Rank Equally and Rank Equally in Payment, they also (perhaps 
inadvertently) suggested implicitly that Rank Equally in Payment had the same meaning as Pay 
Equally (despite the difference in wording).   Thus, the ruling, while pushing in the direction of 
the Rational Design model by giving meaning to some differences in language among the 
clauses, was not fully consistent with the model since the court ignored certain other differences 
in language.  
 
To summarize, the NML courts appeared to have adopted a position close to the Rational 
Design model by following the traditional doctrinal view that contracts written by sophisticated 
parties are precisely and intentionally tailored.4 This particular interpretation permits us to 
                                                 
4 For examples of applause from New York lawyers for the NML courts having followed strict New York contract 
principles of enforcing contracts “as written”, see Steel, Zarrini & Goldinstein (2014); Keenan (2012). For purposes 
of our study what is relevant is that the NML courts appeared to be suggesting in 2011 and 2012 that a key element 
of their decision was the precise wording of the clauses.  That understanding of the courts’ ruling  gave parties an 
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examine how the markets reacted to the courts’ decisions and to ask whether the variations in the 
formulations of pari passu that existed prior to the courts’ interpretation of the clause were the 
product of tailoring or tinkering.  If the Random Mutation model is correct, we expect that 
contracting parties ultimately will respond to the courts’ interpretation by eliminating the 
variation in the contracts and returning to the original Rank Equally version of the clause.  If the 
Rational Design model is correct, we expect either no changes in the language of the clause 
(assuming the courts correctly identified the market’s preferred variations) or efforts to 
reintroduce desired variation in the terms. 
 
 The evidence from this case study supports the Random Mutation model. We find that 
market-wide revisions to the pari passu term take significantly longer to be implemented than 
would be expected for boilerplate terms in general under the Rational Design model.  Moreover, 
consistent with the Random Mutation model, when the market ultimately revises the pari passu 
term, the previous variations of the clause are abandoned in favor of returning the standard 
language to a single coherent version.  This data supports the inference that random mutation 
rather than rational design may better explain the variations in boilerplate terms that have lost 
much if not all contemporary meaning. Our study thus contributes to the broader, and as yet 
unresolved, debate over how best to interpret boilerplate terms in standardized commercial 
contracts (Davis 2010; Baird 2013; Radin 2014).5  
 
The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part II, we describe the dataset and outline our 
strategy for coding the several revisions to pari passu that followed the NML decisions.  Part III 
develops the competing theories and generates hypotheses for each.  Part IV describes the 
empirical tests and lays out our findings.  We conclude in Part V. 
                                                                                                                                                             
incentive to clarify the language of their contracts (if they disagreed with the court) (IMF 2014; Galvis 2017).  
However, on December 22, 2016 in a follow-up case to NML, the trial court explained that its decision to grant the 
2011 injunction had not been purely the product of the contract language, but was based as well on Argentina’s 
misbehavior vis-à-vis its creditors and the court. White Hawthorne, LLC, et al. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 16-cv-
1042, (S.D.N.Y. December 22, 2016).  Arguably, in the post-December 2016 era the incentives for parties to alter 
their contractual language have diminished.  In any event, our analysis covers only the period up to December 31, 
2016. 
5 Courts in multiple jurisdictions have suggested that boilerplate contracts should be interpreted differently, and in a 
fashion that takes into account that these are mass market products.  See, e.g., Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. 
Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 Sup. Ct. of Canada 37 (CanLII); Marblegate Asset Mgt. v. Education 
Mgt. Corp. 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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II. Data 
 
To test the question whether rational design or random mutation better explains variations 
in boilerplate language, we assembled a dataset of sovereign bonds issued from June 1, 2011, 
roughly six months prior to the SDNY decision on December 7, 2011, when the court issued its 
controversial interpretation of the pari passu clause and suggested that its reasoning was 
primarily a matter of strict contract interpretation.  Briefs in the SDNY case were circulating 
several months before December 2011 and some market actors might have predicted the 
outcome.  We start our examination six months prior to the SDNY decision to allow for market 
reactions in anticipation of the SDNY decision.  The dataset runs to December 22, 2016, when 
the same judge in the earlier SDNY decision said that contract language was only one of the 
factors leading to his decision. 
 
For data, we used the Perfect Information database, the most extensive source of 
sovereign debt documents.  Our dataset contains 829 sovereign bond offerings from 92 sovereign 
issuers.  These were all issuers who at some stage had used a pari passu clause in their sovereign 
bonds. For our analysis, we focused only on sovereign bond offerings under foreign law, such as 
New York or English law: those are the bond offerings that pose the greatest risk of holdout 
creditors utilizing the pari passu clause to block a restructuring.6  Limiting the dataset to foreign 
law offerings left us with 691 sovereign bond offerings from 90 different sovereign issuers.   
 
Using the SDNY interpretation and the Rational Design model as a baseline, we coded all 
changes in the pari passu term for every issuance in terms of the presumed impact of the 
revisions in pari passu language.  Since the NML case involved litigation by creditors who had 
refused to participate in Argentina’s attempt to restructure its debt and who obtained a powerful 
judicial remedy instead (“holdout” creditors), we code the changes to the contract language in 
terms of whether it increased or decreased the risk of holdouts. We divided the changes into two 
                                                 
6 Bonds under local laws have little vulnerability to holdouts, since the sovereign can alter the law ex post. 
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categories: a) those that entailed a direct change to the core language of the pari passu clause and 
thus resulted in a major change in the risk of holdouts (“Major” change); and b) those that 
attempted to augment the evidentiary record on the meaning of the term without directly 
changing its language, which we posit had only a minor impact on the risk of holdouts 
(“Evidentiary” change). 
 
1. Major Changes in Pari Passu Risk 
The Major changes in holdout risk derive from variations in the core language of the pari 
passu clause. Our baseline for each bond was the version of the clause that the issuer was using 
before June 1, 2011.  From that baseline, we examined the changes in the language of the clause. 
 
The traditional version of the pari passu clause states something along the following 
lines: 
The notes rank and will rank without any preference among themselves and pari passu 
with all other unsubordinated public external indebtedness of the Republic.  
We term this traditional version the “Rank Equally” pari passu clause (for the history, see 
Weidemaier, Scott & Gulati 2013).  Importantly, the Rank Equally clause does not refer to 
“payment” in its “rank without any preference” language.   Because this “payment” language 
appeared to be key to the NML courts granting the initial injunctions against Argentina in 2011-
12, we coded the Rank Equally clause, which lacked that “payment” language, as posing a low 
risk of holdouts.  
 
As noted earlier, prior research has documented that the Rank Equally version of the 
clause was the original formulation. The other versions of the clause were mutations from this 
original form and we describe them below. 
 
The first variation provides explicitly that each creditor will be entitled to ratable 
payments. For example, Italy, in 2010, employed a pari passu clause in its New York law bonds 
stating that: 
The Securities … will rank equally with all other . . . unsecured . . . obligations of Italy 
….  Amounts payable [on]. . . the Securities will be charged upon and be payable out of 
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the [Treasury of Italy], equally and ratably so charged and amounts payable in respect 
of all other general loan obligations of Italy. 
 We term this version of the clause that provides for explicit ratable payments, the “Pay Equally” 
clause.  The Pay Equally clause poses a high risk of holdouts:  this was the meaning of pari 
passu the holdouts were arguing for in the Argentine litigation.  
 
A second variation of the clause promised investors: 
The bonds rank and will rank pari passu in right of payment with all other unsecured . . .  
External Indebtedness of the debtor.7 
We term this the “Rank Equally in Payment” clause.  Prior to 2011, the Rank Equally in 
Payment clause posed an uncertain risk of holdouts.  On the one hand, the Rank Equally in 
Payment clause used the word “payment” which, read literally, seemed to imply that holdouts 
would have a greater ability to obtain equal payments as compared with the Rank Equally 
version of the clause.  On the other hand, the Rank Equally in Payment version did not explicitly 
specify “ratable” payments unlike the Pay Equally formulation.  In terms of holdout risk, 
therefore, Rank Equally in Payment sits somewhere between the Rank Equally and Pay Equally 
versions. 
 
The Rank Equally in Payment clause was the version of pari passu seized on by NML 
Capital in the case against Argentina. NML Capital argued that a sovereign debtor in arrears to 
creditors had to pay the creditors who ranked “pari passu in right of payment” on a pro rata basis 
(Blackmun & Mukhi 2010).  Further—and this was important given that a court’s order to pay is 
largely meaningless against a sovereign debtor—the clause allegedly entitled a creditor who was 
not paid its pro rata share to an injunction against other creditors who were paid that share 
(Weidemaier & Gelpern 2013). 
 
The final variation that we coded incorporates a term that subjects the pari passu clause 
to the application of mandatory local law (the “Mandatory Law” clause). In these bonds, words 
such as “except as subject to provisions of mandatory law” supplement the pari passu language. 
                                                 
7 On the evolution of these clauses and their risk levels, see Buchheit & Martos (2014), Weidemaier, Scott & Gulati 
(2013). 
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The sovereign with this clause in its bonds can change its local law to forbid the payment to 
holdout creditors. The Mandatory Law clause accordingly creates the lowest risk of holdouts.  
 
 Table 1 depicts the four different variations and, assuming a court takes the Rational 
Design perspective in interpretation, the risk of holdouts each variant represented both prior to 
and after the SDNY decision. 
 
Table 1 
Type of Pari Passu Clause Pre-SDNY 
Holdout 
Risk Level 
Post-SDNY 
Holdout 
Risk Level 
Pay Equally High High 
Rank Equally in Payment Medium High 
Rank Equally Low Low 
Mandatory Law Lowest Lowest 
 
 
2. Evidentiary Changes 
We focus our analysis here on whether, in response to the SDNY decision attaching 
importance to the variations in pari passu, market actors revised their clauses to eliminate those 
variations or chose instead an alternate approach. Because of the inertia costs affecting parties 
who face the challenge of revising (in an evidentiary vacuum) terms that lack an apparent 
meaning, we conjecture that parties may choose to add to the evidentiary record on the meaning 
of the term (termed an Evidentiary change).  Parties may be concerned that courts will use any 
new formulations of a term as evidence that the clauses in prior deals mean something different 
from the new clause.  An Evidentiary change minimizes the risk of the change adversely 
affecting the meaning of clauses in prior deals.  Given the evidentiary vacuum, any additional 
evidence may potentially have a disproportionate effect on how a court will interpret the term.  
To get at this question, we coded not just for Major changes (revisions to the core language of 
the clause), but also Evidentiary changes (attempts to add evidence about what the clause meant 
that was in addition to (or instead of) any changes to the contract term itself).   
Draft: March 21, 2017 
 11 
 
We term Evidentiary changes as minor because they have a lower likelihood of affecting 
a court’s interpretation than would a direct change in the core language of the clause.  As we 
discuss more fully below, the impact of an Evidentiary change on risk depends on the existing 
stock of evidence on the meaning of the term.  Where the meaning of a boilerplate term is well 
known, there is likely little value in parties trying to add to the background evidence on meaning.  
Put differently, we would  expect Evidentiary changes to appear where the meaning of a term is 
unknown or at least uncertain. 
 
 The first category of Evidentiary changes was a disavowal of a particular meaning of the 
clause: sovereigns inserted language in the bond documentation that purported to explain that the 
clause did not mean that a creditor was ever entitled to ratable payments with other creditors of 
equal rank.  A second, and more passive, Evidentiary change involves reporting to investors that 
the pari passu clause in the contract posed a risk of a particular, disfavored interpretation for 
investors. 
 
III. Theory and Predictions  
 
1. NML v. Argentina as a Test of Competing Theories 
In theory, one could test the Rational Design and Random Mutation models by observing 
the impact on contracting behavior of a court ruling that, say, “best efforts” and “reasonable 
efforts” terms in commercial contracts have the same meaning.  If the parties intended the terms 
to capture different degrees of effort, consistent with Rational Design we should observe 
modified contracts that clarify the meaning the parties intended. If, on the other hand, variation 
in the boilerplate was Random Mutation, parties instead should eliminate the mutations and 
return to core version of the term. 
 
In reality, for several reasons the conditions to employ such a test rarely appear.  First, 
courts are not always clear about the precise interpretation they adopt and often give multiple 
reasons for their decisions. Second, market actors might not acquire sufficient information from 
a given court decision to motivate contract revisions, especially if the courts in question are 
Draft: March 21, 2017 
 12 
obscure.  As a result, we might not observe evidence of a response to court decisions on 
contracts even if the market disagrees with a court’s interpretation.  
 
NML v. Argentina presents the exception that allows us to test the Random Mutation or 
Rational Design question for the following reasons: 
• The courts made clear the importance of the precise formulation of the contract 
language (specifically the use of the word “payment”) to their decision.  Consider 
the language of the Second Circuit: 
The particular language of the pari passu clause dictated a certain result in 
this case, but going forward, sovereigns and lenders are free to . . . draft 
different pari passu clauses that support the goal of avoiding holdout 
creditors.8 
• The courts made their decision in a fashion that predicts changes in contract 
language (in reaction to the decision) under both models, albeit in different 
directions and to different degrees; 
• The courts that tackled the question were prominent in the business world so there 
was reason to expect a reaction; 
• The market actors (sovereign states and their advisers) were all sophisticated and 
informed about the case (the Financial Times alone reported the details of the 
NML v. Argentina case in more than a hundred articles and blog posts). 
  
Given the turmoil caused by NML v. Argentina, a literature has developed on the Rational 
Design versus Random Mutation question in the precise context of the pari passu clause, with 
both academics and practitioners on either side (Kahan & Leshem 2017; Steel, Zarrini & 
Goldinstein 2014; Keenan 2012; Wright 2011; Burn 2014; Goss 2014). In the following sections 
we describe the competing theories and the predictions they generate. 
 
2. Rational Design 
As noted above, the pari passu clause comes in four versions: Rank Equally, Rank 
Equally in Payment, Pay Equally and one of the three mentioned versions plus Mandatory Law.  
At issue in the Argentine litigation was the Rank Equally in Payment version.  The plaintiffs 
                                                 
8 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 248 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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argued that Rank Equally in Payment meant the same as Pay Equally, giving them a right to an 
injunction barring payments to other creditors unless they were paid ratably on their claims. 
Argentina countered that the Rank Equally in Payment language was the same as Rank Equally, 
which they argued was no more than a promise that the country would not pass a law changing 
the legal rank of the bond. The trial court did not make the precise rationale for its ruling clear, 
but allowed a significant possibility that the Rank Equally in Payment variation now meant the 
same thing legally as Pay Equally.  That uncertainty was enough to motivate both the IMF and 
the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) to recommend that market participants 
revise their clauses (IMF 2014; ICMA 2014). 
 
In a world of rational design, the variation in the phrasing of the clauses is conscious and 
intentional, and the different clauses are promising different rights to creditors. In particular, as 
Kahan and Leshem (2017) do, one could tell a story that the pari passu clause mediates between 
the ability of investors to hold out against a restructuring which may impede value-increasing 
resolutions to sovereign distress, and the moral hazard problem of sovereigns being financially 
undisciplined if the restructuring option is too readily available.  Some sovereigns may rationally 
prefer a different balance between these competing concerns, leading them to choose pari passu 
clauses with varying levels of exposure to holdouts in a restructuring.9 
 
In the world of rational design, there are several possible responses to the SDNY 
decision.  First, the market might agree with the court’s decision treating Rank Equally in 
Payment as the same, or similar to, the Pay Equally version of the clause.  In this case, no change 
should occur to contracts after the SDNY opinion.  We can readily dispose of this version of the 
rational design story.  As we report below, after an initial period with no changes, we observe 
rapidly increasing changes to the pari passu clause in our dataset.  Second, the market may 
prefer a variation in the pari passu term that differs from the SDNY’s interpretation.  In 
particular, equating Rank Equally in Payment as the same as or similar to Pay Equally disturbs 
                                                 
9 Recall from Part II (1) supra, that the Rank Equally version of pari passu at best gives creditors protection only 
against legal (de jure) subordination, creating only a low risk of holdouts.  In contrast, Pay Equally gives creditors 
protection against payment (de facto) subordination, imposing a high risk of holdouts on sovereigns.  Rank Equally 
in Payment lies somewhere between Rank Equally and Pay Equally in a probabilistic sense: a court might rule either 
way thus creating a medium risk of holdouts from an ex ante perspective (Kahan & Leshem 2017).  Finally, a 
sovereign that incorporates the Mandatory Law version of the pari passu clause renders the protections of the clause 
subject to the whims of the sovereign debtor’s local legislature. 
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the parties’ allocation of risks if the intent of those sovereigns was to select a holdout risk 
somewhere between Rank Equally and Pay Equally. In this case, when sovereigns and other 
market participants draft new terms to better reflect their intent, contract drafters should revise 
the Rank Equally in Payment clauses to reduce the risk of holdouts below that of the Pay Equally 
version. For example, parties could add ancillary language indicating that holdouts are only paid 
ratably if the sovereign behaves opportunistically. We would not expect any changes with the 
other variations in pari passu clauses since the court’s decision did not reinterpret them.  
 
A body of literature, specifically focused on standard-form contracts, suggests that 
boilerplate terms may be “sticky.”  Because of network externalities, organizational routines and 
other costs of revision, contracting parties might find themselves using suboptimal terms.  
(Kahan & Klausner 1997; Smith & King 2009).  In contrast, a variant of the Rational Design 
model posits that where sophisticated market participants disagree with a court’s interpretation 
and prefer to return to their original understanding prior to the decision, the parties will promptly 
do so.  The extended period without changes that we observe in the data discussed below allows 
us to dispose of this ‘no inertia’ variant of the Rational Design model in the pari passu context. 
 
To summarize, the predictions from the Rational Design model are that the market will 
respond, possibly after delay, as follows: (1) the clauses stating Rank Equally in Payment will 
have additional language inserted to make clear that this clause is neither Rank Equally or Pay 
Equally, but incorporates a place in between (thus returning to the pre-SDNY bargain) and (2) 
the other three types of clauses will not change.   
 
3. Random Mutation 
The Random Mutation model is based on earlier theoretical literature (Goetz & Scott 
1985) and on the reports from interviews conducted with market actors after the pari passu cases 
(Gulati & Scott 2013; Choi, Gulati & Scott 2017).  A common view the market actors conveyed 
in the interviews was that the variation in the language of the clauses is largely meaningless and 
that all pari passu clauses embody the same intent. In aggregate, there were two principal 
components to the respondents’ random mutation story. First, there was only one core pari passu 
clause and market participants understood the small variations in language as part of a single 
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standard form.  Second, these variations in the formulation of the clause were not being 
harmonized because of the lack of focal points: the absence of any simple means of coordination 
was a category of inertia costs unique to boilerplate terms such as pari passu that lacked any 
apparent meaning. The lack of meaning of a term repeated by rote over many years implies that 
there is an evidentiary vacuum for courts seeking to interpret the term. 
 
Market actors particularly stressed the importance of the unique inertia costs associated 
with a term that lacks an understood meaning: They offered four primary explanations for why 
change occurred slowly, even if there was widespread belief that the courts had erred:  
• First Mover Costs:  Markets value standardization.  Correcting language without being 
confident that others in the market were similarly modifying their contracts is risky 
because no one knows how the market will react to individual deviations from the 
standard form. 
• Court Correction:  Future courts, and particularly more sophisticated appellate courts, 
might correct the errors made by the lower courts.  Modifying contract language prior to 
observing the actions of these other courts runs the risk of making premature drafting 
decisions.  
• Debt Overhang:  Many issuers have large portions of their debt outstanding with the old, 
now problematic, version of the clause. Changing current clauses would cast doubt on the 
meaning of the old clauses, perhaps causing the markets to discount the older bonds. 
Traders do not like to differentiate among the bonds of the same sovereign and having to 
do so might cause them to abandon that sovereign’s bonds altogether. 
• Agency Problems:  Neither the issuer’s representatives or the bankers involved in routine 
sovereign issuances are likely to be employed when the sovereign goes into crisis.  Their 
incentives tend to be short term; they want to raise funds and earn fees.  If and when 
things go wrong, a different set of people will be involved.  
 
The evidentiary vacuum described above motivates the practitioners’ explanations for 
inertia. Where inertia derives primarily from the evidentiary vacuum surrounding the 
interpretation of a term that has lost much if not all meaning, inertia costs should have a much 
stronger negative effect on experimentation with the actual language of a meaningless term: the 
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very act of experimentation may negatively affect the evidence in court. Thus, parties choose 
instead to wait until higher courts have every opportunity to correct the errors below. Under the 
Random Mutation model, we also predict higher costs associated with being a first mover, 
particularly where the first mover runs a greater risk of destabilizing the meaning of its existing 
stock of contracts. The market may also impose a pricing penalty on a first mover who acts 
unilaterally to change the market standard.  We therefore predict little experimentation with the 
direct language of an essentially meaningless term until key market actors move together to a 
new standard.  Because market-wide collectivizing actions take time, we predict that inertia will 
for last a significant period when evidentiary costs drive the inertia.  We predict that subsets of 
market participants may instead experiment with lower risk efforts to shape the evidentiary 
burden of proof (Evidentiary changes).   In addition, we predict that under the Random Mutation 
model we should see more such evidence-related experimentation when: 
(1)  the costs of an erroneous court interpretation are more salient to a particular issuer, such 
as issuers that have recently defaulted (and thus face an heightened risk of holdouts); 
(2)  agency costs are reduced because the parties involved (including particular law firms) 
are more likely to be engaged in any eventual restructuring and thus bear the costs of bad 
drafting and are also able to collectivize the costs of experimentation across multiple 
issuers.  
(3) the sovereign is a newer issuer and has minimal debt overhang and therefore worries less 
about the effects of an erroneous court interpretation. 
 
4. Inertia Cost Predictions  
We identify circumstances where the various inertia costs that affect the Random 
Mutation model are reduced and test whether we see movement toward a single standard.  If first 
mover costs matter, one might predict that changes are more likely to occur after meetings at 
which parties agree to change to a particular standard clause or when the lawyers in question are 
high volume issuers who can assure individual clients that others will also be revising their 
clauses. 
 
To test this prediction, we focus on three meetings on reforming the pari passu clause 
that occurred in October 2014 among the key players in the market: (1) a meeting at Columbia 
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Law School that included the leading sovereign lawyers from New York and London firms 
where the question discussed was why the pari passu clauses still had not been revised; (2) the 
World Bank/IMF annual meeting in Washington DC where there were multiple educational 
sessions for government debt managers on the need for reform of the clauses; and (3) a small 
meeting of elite New York lawyers at the New York Fed, to obtain agreement on a common plan 
to reform the clauses.10 
 
Based on the foregoing, we divide the time line into two periods for our initial analysis.  
The first period runs from June 1, 2011 to September 30, 2014 (termed the “Early Period”). The 
second period runs from October 1, 2014 to December 22, 2016 (termed the “Late Period”). To 
test the importance of the actions that took place in October 2014, we examine whether the 
frequency as well as type of pari passu changes, including Major and Evidentiary changes, differ 
between these two periods.  
 
5. Relative Differences in Inertia Costs between the two Models 
Inertia costs could affect boilerplate terms generally including those that have well-
known meaning.  Under the Rational Design model, market participants may wish to redraft 
terms misinterpreted by a court so as to return to their preferred contractual risk allocation but 
may initially be constrained by learning or network externalities.  We nonetheless posit that the 
magnitude of inertia costs for boilerplate terms that have lost meaning through rote usage and 
encrustation are larger than for ordinary boilerplate terms.  
  
Consider a boilerplate term where courts have access to a substantial body of evidence on 
the parties’ understanding of the meaning of the term. Parties seeking to revise such a term will 
consider the impact of any revision on the stock of evidence on the meaning of the term. But in 
this case, a single change to the existing stock of evidence will have only a marginal effect on a 
subsequent interpretation of the term’s meaning in other contracts. Rather, the evidentiary 
uncertainty affecting boilerplate terms with well understood meanings is a product of how courts 
and the market will react to any changes in the term’s language that purport to impose a new 
                                                 
10 Two of us organized the Columbia Law School meeting with the goal of studying the question of why the clauses 
had not changed in response to the NML cases (Choi, Gulati & Scott 2017). The fact that that meeting may have 
served as a coordinating device was inadvertent and contrary to what we were trying to study (the lack of change). 
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meaning.  Parties may also consider whether the change will affect the allocation of risks under 
the agreement and whether the resulting uncertainty may lead to a demand for a price 
adjustment. Finally, parties will consider network effects -- how the revision may affect the 
meaning of complementary terms.   
 
By contrast, pricing and network related inertia costs should be small for a term that rote 
usage has rendered meaningless. If investors do not attach legal weight to minor variations in 
language, there will not be any pricing impact.  Similarly, to the extent such a term has only 
symbolic meaning, there will not be complementary terms that link to the meaningless term.  
Instead, the source of inertia for a meaningless term will be the evidentiary vacuum. For 
boilerplate terms that have lost their meaning, there is likely little or no evidence for courts to 
consider when discerning this lost meaning.  These terms are acontextual:  there is a contractual 
black hole not only with respect to the meaning but also as to any evidence of that meaning. 
 
In sum, rote usage robs terms of any apparent meaning and encrustation with legal jargon 
makes things worse by suggesting alternate new meanings when in fact no such varying 
meanings exist. Parties are reluctant to change because they cannot offer a plausible alternative 
to the aberrant interpretation: an evidentiary vacuum exists on the meaning of the term. 
Coordination is more difficult because parties lack focal points -– commonly understood 
meanings around which to coordinate their reform proposals.  As a result, parties, especially 
those with debt overhang, have greater uncertainty about how courts will respond to the changes 
they do make. Given the underlying absence of meaning, the resulting uncertainty over a judicial 
interpretation will increase the costs of crafting a solution even for those parties with heightened 
interest in addressing the risk of a future restructuring. We predict, therefore, that changes in 
boilerplate terms affected by rote usage and encrustation in the Random Mutation model will 
take significantly longer to be revised than boilerplate terms in general under the Rational Design 
model.  Instead, we predict that contracting parties dealing with a meaningless boilerplate term 
will initially focus on evidentiary changes to fill the vacuum on the meaning of the terms. 
 
6. Comparing Differential Inertia Costs:  The Example of CACS 
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We do not formally test whether the time until Major changes occur in boilerplate terms 
is greater if boilerplate terms lack meaning and are encrusted with meaningless variations; the 
data to do that test is not available here.  That said, an indication of this differential cost of 
dislodging boilerplate is available. 
 
Fifteen years ago, litigation in Brussels involving the pari passu clause raised many of 
the same arguments about the term’s meaning.  The court in Elliott v. Peru also granted an 
injunction to the holdout creditors; a ruling that caused considerable consternation in the 
international financial community (Blackmun & Mukhi 2010).  Two  contractual solutions to the 
aberrant interpretation were proposed: (a) revise the pari passu clause directly to disavow the 
court’s interpretation; and (b) overhaul the modification clauses in the standard contract.  The 
modification clauses (collective action clauses or CACs) were, in contrast to the pari passu 
clauses, well understood, familiar and more frequently used relative to pari passu  (Gelpern & 
Gulati 2006).  At the time of the Brussels litigation, sovereign bonds governed by New York law 
required unanimous approval by all the creditors for a modification of the key contract terms.  
Unanimity, in turn, created a serious holdout problem; a problem made worse to the extent the 
holdouts had a powerful weapon such as the injunction issued by the judge in Brussels.  There 
were, therefore, two ways to solve the problem.  Market participants could either make it 
difficult to be a holdout by reforming the vote required to modify contract terms to some 
percentage less than unanimity (say, to 75%) or reform the pari passu clauses to remove the 
weapon that the holdouts would need to implement their strategy. 
 
Both possibilities were considered (Gelpern & Gulati 2006). And it was obvious to those 
involved in the reform process that revising the CAC or modification terms was going to be an 
incomplete solution since a powerful creditor or group of creditors could still obtain a holdout 
position (instead of a single bond, they would now require 25% of the bonds).  The optimal 
solution would probably have been to modify both sets of clauses. Yet, coordination among the 
market actors could only be obtained on reforming the CACs--an action that took roughly two 
and a half years (from late 2001 to mid 2003) (Choi & Gulati 2004).   
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As it turned out, the CAC reforms were not enough to eliminate the holdout problem.  
Countries like Greece and Ukraine that had CACs still had to deal with the threat of holdouts 
who had obtained blocking positions in some of their 75% bonds (Gelpern, Heller & Setser 
2016).  And, importantly, the pari passu threat did not disappear.  So, after the SDNY decision in 
2011, calls to solve the the problem began again. This time, though, the Official Sector not only 
attempted to improve the CACs but also to coordinate changes in the pari passu clauses.11  As of 
mid-2016, nearly five years after the SDNY decision and fifteen years after the Brussels 
decision, widespread change is occurring (Figures 2 & 3).   
 
If one compares the two clauses, changes to the CAC are more complex to implement 
than revisions to pari passu. The former involves modifying the mechanics of creditor voting 
and consideration of complex issues about eligible voters, the mechanics of voting, conflicts of 
interest and so on. The pari passu revisions, by contrast, should have been simple—just a 
deletion (or, in the alternative an explanation) of the clause that no one understood.  Yet, the 
CAC revisions have occurred relatively quickly and seamlessly as compared to pari passu. 
 
The comparison is imperfect: we are comparing clauses that perform different functions. 
There are other stories one can tell about why CACs were changed relatively quickly and pari 
passu reform has taken over a decade and half.  Yet, the motivation for changing both clauses 
was the same.  And the clause that was not changed was the simpler one to repair (just a few 
lines to be deleted as compared to multiple pages of complex voting mechanics) and would have 
more directly addressed the problem at hand. Our hypothesis is that no one really understood the 
pari passu clause: it was in an evidentiary vacuum in contrast to the market’s clear 
understanding of the modification clauses. 
 
7. The Dynamics of Changes to the Pari Passu Clause 
Our tests distinguish between the Rational Design and Random Mutation hypotheses by 
focusing on the dynamics of the changes to a boilerplate contract term. For pricing and network 
related inertia that affect ordinary boilerplate terms, we predict under the Rational Design 
                                                 
11 The Official Sector also attempted to enhance the CACs that previously applied only on single bonds into an 
Aggregated CAC across multiple bond issues–a highly complex venture involving changing a clause that was 
originally a few lines long to something many pages in length (Gelpern, Heller & Setser 2016). 
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hypothesis that contracting parties may overcome this inertia by experimenting directly with the 
terms’ language—testing the price response of contracting parties in the market as well as the 
effect of the terms on complementary terms.  Moreover, larger market participants such as 
frequent underwriter’s counsel will help collectivize market action and correspond with this 
experimentation. We predict, therefore, that even if inertia costs affect the Rational Design 
model, those market participants that overcome the inertia costs are more likely to make Major 
changes—changes directly to the language of the term.  In this model, there is no room for 
Evidentiary changes.  
 
The Random Mutation story posits an evidentiary vacuum or contractual black hole. 
Here, because no one understands the clause, the first step in reforming the clause is likely to be 
an effort to develop a meaning.  And a particular subset of actors—those who are at greater risk 
that this evidentiary vacuum could impose costs in the fashion of the NML case—will have the 
greatest incentives to give the clause meaning via Evidentiary changes. Specifically, we predict 
that issuers associated with collectivizing agents who are able to reduce coordination costs, such 
as large law firms, issuers for whom the risk of default is more salient, and issuers without any 
prior debt overhang from earlier bond deals will be more likely to engage in evidentiary 
experimentation. These parties will first attempt to discern how the market responds to their 
partial assertions of meaning before actually changing the language of the clause itself. When the 
market eventually collectivizes to directly change the language of a meaningless term, the 
change will occur rapidly and not correlate with factors that normally would be associated with 
reducing inertia costs. 
 
In addition to relative differences in inertia costs, one other empirical prediction can 
distinguish the models.  The Rational Design model predicts that once direct changes to the 
language of a boilerplate term begin in the market, sovereigns will seek to return to the risk 
allocation they intended to create prior to the SDNY opinion. In particular, the Mandatory Law 
and Pay Equally versions of the pari passu clause were not affected by the SDNY opinion and 
thus should remain unchanged.  In contrast, as discussed above, the Random Mutation model 
predicts that parties will revise all the versions of the clause to bring them back to a single 
coherent version. 
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IV. Empirical Tests  
   
1. Overall Major Changes in Holdout Risk 
We first examine Major changes in holdout risk in the pari passu clause.  Under the 
Rational Design model, sovereigns prior to the SDNY opinion in 2011 are at their preferred pari 
passu risk allocation.  The question is when and how these sovereigns will thereafter elect to 
revise their clauses.  Our prediction under the Rational Design model is that increasingly from 
the Late Period of October 2014 onward sovereigns with the Rank Equally in Payment clause 
will change to language that re-creates the sovereigns’ preferred intermediate risk of holdouts.  
However, the sovereigns using the high risk Pay Equally or lowest risk Mandatory Law terms 
will not be motivated to change their clause as these terms were not affected by the SDNY 
opinion.  Sovereigns using the Rank Equally term may or may not change depending on whether 
the sovereigns view the SDNY opinion as having a possible spillover effect on the Rank Equally 
term. 
 
Under the Random Mutation model, in contrast, we predict that after collectivizing 
actions in October 2014 reduce inertia costs in the market, all sovereigns will have little or no 
attachment to their existing terms.  To the extent the market favors a particular version of the 
pari passu clause as the new standard, sovereigns with all the different types of pari passu 
clauses will begin to move toward this standard.  We know from other research that the IMF and 
other collectivizing agents such as ICMA and the US Treasury Department were attempting in 
October 2014 to achieve coordination around Rank Equally, the original (and oldest) version of 
the clause (Goss 2014; Sobel 2016; Choi, Gulati & Scott 2017).  The push to return to the 
original version of the clause implicitly supports the view that later versions were mere 
encrustation. Under the Random Mutation model, therefore, we predict that sovereigns with the 
other three versions of the clause— Mandatory Law, Rank Equally in Payment, and Pay 
Equally—will all move toward the Rank Equally clause as the single market standard. 
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 Table 4 reports by year the frequency of sovereign offerings by type of pari passu clause 
and Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the frequency of different sovereign offerings by 
type of pari passu clause.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
As reported in Table 4 and depicted in Figure 1, we observe a significant decrease in the 
dispersion of pari passu clause types from 2011 to early 2016.  Sovereign offerings with the Pay 
Equally version of pari passu are infrequent across the 2011 to 2016 period (accounting for only 
1.0% of all offerings).  Those sovereign offerings with the Mandatory Law term constitute 
47.2% of the sovereign offerings in 2011 and only 21.5% of the offerings in 2016.  Those 
sovereign offerings with the Rank Equally in Payment clause represent 30.2% of the sovereign 
offerings in 2011 and only 8.3% of the sovereign offerings in 2016.  In contrast, sovereign 
offerings with the Rank Equally clause go from 22.6% of the offerings in 2011 to 69.4% in 2016.  
While sovereign offerings are roughly equally distributed between Mandatory, Rank Equally, 
and Rank Equally in Payment versions of the clause in 2011, by 2016 the Rank Equally version 
of the clause is the majority.  This change is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level.  
This movement to Rank Equally in both directions, from high risk Pay Equally and Rank Equally 
in Payment and from the lowest risk Mandatory Law, supports the Random Mutation model and 
is inconsistent with the Rational Design model.  
  
2. Early Period Analysis 
Under the Rational Design model, each sovereigns’ version of pari passu represents their 
optimal risk allocation.  Therefore, if a court misinterprets a sovereign’s  version of the clause, 
those parties will seek to adjust their clauses thereafter to return to their previously optimal risk 
allocation.  Thus, after the SDNY opinion interpreting Rank Equally in Payment as creating a 
high risk of holdouts, countries that initially understood that same clause as creating only an 
intermediate or medium risk should revise their clauses in an effort to return to the preferred risk 
level.   
 
In contrast, under the Random Mutation model the variations in pari passu are 
meaningless encrustations.  We posit that October 2014 was an important pivot point when key 
market participants and the IMF worked to coordinate on the Rank Equally version as the new 
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market standard.  That said, even in the Early Period prior to October 2014 there ought to have 
been some sovereigns who found the benefits of making small documentation changes 
(Evidentiary changes) outweighed the costs associated with inertia. Specifically, since we have 
an evidentiary vacuum, these ancillary changes can help to fill in the information gap. In 
addition, these early evidentiary moves can help gauge the market reaction to a proposed Major 
change. We predict that countries will deploy Evidentiary changes in the Early Period under the 
Random Mutation model.  In contrast, under the Rational Design model there is no need to 
engage in such Evidentiary changes, since the meanings of the variations are well understood 
and intended.  Sovereigns in the Rational Design model will engage directly in Major changes to 
return to their preferred variations in the pari passu clause. 
 
 Table 5 categorizes sovereign issuers in our data sample based on their pari passu clause 
in the last offering prior to the start of our dataset in 2011.  For each category of pari passu 
clause, we report whether there were Major and Evidentiary changes.   The Major changes are 
divided into two, changes to the language of the core clause (Language change) or changes to the 
Mandatory law addendum (Mandatory change).  For Evidentiary changes, we report whether 
language was added either telling investors about the new risks of clause misinterpretation (Risk 
Factor change) or explaining the issuer’s understanding of the clause (Understanding change). 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 Table 5 shows that only a handful of Major changes occur in the Early Period.  All we 
see is that three sovereigns that had the Rank Equally in Payment clause moved to the Rank 
Equally version. The action that takes place is in terms of Evidentiary changes.  We observe 
from Table 5 that all types of sovereigns (regardless of their original versions of the clause) make 
Evidentiary changes in the Early Period.   
 
For those sovereigns starting initially with the Rank Equally in Payment clause, 23.8% 
employ a Risk Factor change; 19.1% also employ an Understanding change.  A smaller but still 
positive fraction of the sovereigns with the Mandatory Law and Rank Equally clauses also adopt 
Evidentiary changes. This is consistent with inertia affecting the ability of sovereigns to make 
Major changes and with the effort to reduce the evidentiary vacuum.  Figure 3 depicts the 
fraction of sovereign issuances governed by foreign law by quarter that contained a pari passu 
Draft: March 21, 2017 
 25 
term with evidentiary related language that differed from the initial pari passu term the sovereign 
used.  Note that prior to October 2014 a far greater percentage of sovereign issuances reflected 
an Evidentiary change compared with Major changes. 
 
 As a multivariate test of the factors that correlate with the changes, we estimated Cox 
proportional hazard models for the first adoption of any Evidentiary changes in the pari passu 
clause during the Early Period. The Cox proportional hazards model is a type of statistical 
survival model that relates the time to a specified event to various independent variables that 
may affect the amount of time to the event (such as whether the sovereign issuer is investment 
grade).  For the dependent variable we look at when a sovereign adopts any Evidentiary change 
in the Early Period. 
 
We include as an independent variable the log of the offering amount in U.S. dollars (ln 
(Offer Amount)), whether the sovereign issuer is investment grade (Investment Grade), whether 
the issuer's counsel was one of the top 3 issuer's counsel in terms of the number of sovereign 
offerings in the 2000 to 2010 time period (Top Issuer Counsel), and whether the underwriter's 
counsel was one of the top 3 underwriter's counsel in terms of number of sovereign offerings in 
the 2000 to 2010 time period (Top Underwriter Counsel).  We also include an indicator variable 
for whether the sovereign was initially a country with the Rank Equally in Payment clause.  
Under Rational Design, countries with the Rank Equally in Payment clause will want to return to 
their medium risk level after the NML v. Argentina court opinions. The Random Mutation model 
predicts, in contrast, that countries with the Rank Equally in Payment clause, together with 
countries adopting the Mandatory Law and Pay Equally versions, will all change to one version 
(likely the original one). 
 
Model 1 of Table 6 reports that the coefficient on Top Issuer Counsel is positive and 
significant at the 5% level.  The presence of a Top Issuer Counsel correlates with a 531% 
increase in the probability of an Evidentiary change in the pari passu clause in the Early Period.  
The importance of Top Issuer Counsel as a facilitator of change is consistent with inertia costs.  
Note also that the coefficients on Rank Equally in Payment are not significantly different from 
zero: this is inconsistent with change being focused on those sovereigns with the Rank Equally in 
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Payment clause.  The more widespread distribution of the Evidentiary changes is consistent with 
the Random Mutation model. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 As a further test, we add an indicator variable to Model 1 of Table 6 (“Recent Default”) 
for whether the sovereign defaulted sometime in the 10 years prior to the start of our study. 
Countries that recently defaulted may find the risk of holdouts more salient and have a greater 
incentive to engage in an Evidentiary change in the Early Period.12  Model 2 of Table 6 reports 
results. 
 
The presence of a Top Issuer Counsel in a sovereign offering is, again, strongly 
correlated with an increased probability of a Risk Factor and Understanding change.  The 
coefficient on Rank Equally in Payment is, again, not significantly different from zero.  This lack 
of focus for change on the Rank Equally in Payment sovereigns, the sovereigns most affected by 
the NML Capital decision, is inconsistent with the Rational Design model.  The coefficient on 
Recent Default is also positive and significant at the 5% level.  Consistent with the Random 
Mutation model, countries that recently defaulted—like Greece, Ecuador and Ukraine, for whom 
the shock of the SDNY opinion is greater than the general population of issuers—are 
significantly more likely to implement an Evidentiary change.  Note that none of these Recent 
Default sovereigns started with the Rank Equally in Payment clause:  they have either the 
Mandatory Law or Rank Equally versions.  Despite not being directly affected by the NML v. 
Argentina court opinions, these recently defaulting sovereigns engage in an Evidentiary change 
related to their pari passu clause in the Early Period—a change that is consistent with the 
Random Mutation model and inconsistent with Rational Design.  Recall that sovereigns that have 
recently restructured have three characteristics that predict lower inertia costs than the general 
population of issuers. First, lower agency costs; since the agents on the deal are likely to be 
restructuring specialists and thus will be involved on any subsequent restructuring deal.  Second, 
if the sovereign had to restructure recently, it is likely weak and at a high risk of a new 
restructuring.  Third, there is very little debt overhang with those sovereigns since their prior 
debt was just restructured.   
                                                 
12 Evidence tells us that sovereigns that do distressed restructurings have a high likelihood of doing them again in 
the near future (Mariscal et al. 2015). 
Draft: March 21, 2017 
 27 
 
We next test the importance of coordination among groups of countries to modify the 
pari passu clause collectively.  There are two such groups—the Eurozone countries and Latin 
American countries. Historically, issuers and their lawyers for the Euro area and for Latin 
American sovereigns have acted in a more coordinated fashion.  In the Eurozone, the debt 
managers of the various sovereigns have regular meetings because of the single currency, and, 
we know from a different context, they explicitly discuss matters such as contract reform 
(Gelpern & Gulati 2013).  As for Latin America, the issuers there have historically used a 
handful of large New York law firms and, like the Euro area sovereigns, they effectively 
coordinated around a prior contract change some years before (Gelpern & Gulati 2006).  
Moreover, due to Peru and Argentina’s experiences of with the pari passu clause, the risk of 
holdouts may be more salient for the Latin America countries. 
 
We do not include the Eurozone countries in the model because almost no Eurozone 
country engaged in a change relating to the pari passu clause in the Early Period (adding an 
indicator variable for a Eurozone sovereign issuer in the model resulted in a failure in the model 
to return standard errors due to collinearity). Instead, we added to Model 1 an indicator variable 
for Latin America.  Model 3 of Table 6 reports the results.  In Model 3, note that the coefficient 
on Latin America is positive and significant at the 1% level.  Latin American sovereigns are 
much more likely to make evidentiary changes in the Early Period.  In Model 3 also note that the 
coefficient on Top Issuer Counsel is no longer significant, but the coefficient on Top 
Underwriter’s Counsel is positive and significant at the 10% level.  The presence of Evidentiary 
changes in the Early Period and the importance of factors associated with reducing inertia (such 
as Top Issuer Counsel, Recent Default and coordination and holdout risk salience in the case of 
Latin America) are consistent with the Random Mutation model.   
 
3. Late Period Analysis 
The collectivizing actions taken in October 2014 correlate with an increase in Major 
changes in holdout risk in the Late Period as reported in Table 7.  And these changes are toward 
the low risk Rank Equally clause. In essence what we believe the data to show is that once inertia 
costs were reduced (via the meetings in October 2014), sovereigns began to abandon the 
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variations in the pari passu clause and move to a single core version of the clause.  These 
movements toward a single clause, as discussed above, are inconsistent with the Rational Design 
model. 
 
4. Testing the IMF Pressure Hypothesis 
There is an alternative hypothesis consistent with some degree of Rational Design that is 
specific to the context of the SDNY decision.  Under this story, countries have varying 
preferences on what level of pari passu holdout risk to adopt, but owing to pressure from the 
IMF they are impelled to move toward the the Rank Equally term that was favored by the IMF. 
The NML decision, after all, put at risk the IMF’s de facto preferred creditor status (Allen & 
Overy 2012), without which its ability to lend would be constrained. Further, we also know from 
the IMF’s reports that it published “scorecards” in 2014 and 2016 evaluating whether countries 
had switched to the version of the clauses—Rank Equally—that it had approved of (IMF 2014, 
2017).  We test this “IMF Pressure” model below. 
 
 To refute the IMF Pressure hypothesis we focus first on the pattern of changes in the 
Late Period.  The premise in the IMF Pressure model is that the IMF, because it fears that its 
lending will be put in jeopardy by the actions of holdout creditors, wants countries to switch to 
clauses that lower the risk of holdouts (i.e., toward the Mandatory Law end of the pari passu risk 
spectrum). Under the IMF Pressure model, therefore, we should see those countries with riskier 
clauses in terms of allowing holdouts (i.e., toward the Pay Equally end of the pari passu risk 
spectrum) change their clause to the IMF’s recommended clause to reduce their holdout risk 
level.  What we should not see here, under the IMF Pressure model, is any country shifting risk 
levels up.  That would, after all, be contrary to the IMF’s interests.  
 
Table 7 reports the frequency of Major changes for each sovereign based on the initial 
type of pari passu clause.   
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Ten of the Major changes involve sovereigns that initially used the Rank Equally in Payment 
clause and 17 were sovereigns that had the Mandatory Law clause. In 12 instances, the 
sovereigns with a Mandatory Law clause removed the clause, increasing their exposure to pari 
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passu risk.  Unless we tell a different story about IMF preferences, one that suggests they want 
everyone in the market to have the same provision, this change is inconsistent with the IMF 
pressure hypothesis.  
 
 An alternate test of the IMF pressure hypothesis is to look at changes that were made to 
the pari passu clause that were not the focus of IMF exhortation.  Our proxy for IMF focus is the 
aspect of the clauses that the IMF emphasized in their two progress reports on the adoption of the 
new formulations of pari passu (IMF 2015; 2016).  That focus was on changing the core 
language of the clause that put the sovereign at a greater risk of holdout creditor litigation.  The 
IMF Pressure hypothesis adherents would thus view the fact that sovereigns have moved en 
masse to the low risk “rank equally” formulation as the product of IMF’s desire to protect its 
funds against holdouts and not because the sovereigns themselves want to reduce their risk of 
facing holdout litigation. If so, we should see these countries who were forced to reduce their 
risk vis-à-vis holdouts to take other actions—for example, in parts of the contract that the IMF is 
not monitoring—to simultaneously increase the risk of holdout litigation. One such area is in the 
breadth of a clause. 
 
To illustrate, take a basic formulation of the pari passu clause, which might say “the 
Notes rank equally with all unsecured and unsubordinated External Debt of the Republic” (where 
External Debt is defined as foreign currency obligations of the Republic that are listed on a 
foreign exchange).  This formulation presents a small (albeit not zero) risk of holdout creditor 
litigation.  Let us say now that in order to signal credibility to investors the sovereign wants to 
subject itself to a higher risk of holdouts. The obvious way to do that is to change “rank equally” 
to “rank equally in right of payment.” But that route has been blocked: the IMF disfavors it and 
is shaming those who use that route by reporting them in its annual reports.  A different means of 
increasing risk that is available for the sovereign, however, is to expand the scope of the “rank 
equally” clause by changing its application from “unsecured and unsubordinated External Debt” 
to the broader “all indebtedness” or even broader “all obligations.”  That is, if the sovereign 
wanted to increase its vulnerability to holdouts, while keeping the “rank equally” version of the 
clause, the phrase “Notes rank equally with all other unsecured and unsubordinated External 
Indebtedness” might change to “Notes rank equally with all other indebtedness” or to “Notes 
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rank equally with all other obligations.” 
 
Therefore, if countries really want to subject themselves to higher risks of holdout 
litigation, and the IMF is forcing them to use the low risk “rank equally” formulation, they can 
use the back door technique of increasing their risk by expanding the applicability of their clause 
to more debtors.  By contrast, if they are doing this voluntarily, and the IMF is merely enabling 
coordination around a preferred focal point, then we should see sovereigns using the resulting 
coordination not only to move to the IMF’s suggested “rank equally” formulation, but also to 
move to the narrowest formulation of potential debtors  (“External Indebtedness” as opposed to 
“obligations” or “indebtedness”). 
 
To measure the foregoing effect, we constructed a variable, “Limit to External 
Indebtedness,” which is an indicator for the narrowest version of the clause.  To supplement this 
test, we also look at whether the sovereign used language emphasizing in the risk factors section 
of the offering document that it disfavored the ruling of the NML courts (Risk Factor).  This is 
relevant here because these risk factor disclosures were not advocated or monitored by the IMF 
in its reports; they were steps taken by the sovereigns themselves. 
 
Table 8 reports all the sovereigns in the Late Period that implemented a Major change in 
the pari passu clause in an issuance that did not initially begin with the low risk “rank equally” 
version of clause.  Importantly, the Table also reports whether the sovereign took additional 
steps—beyond those supported by the IMF, to mitigate the impact of the NML decisions.  These 
additional steps, as noted above, include an understanding patch (Understanding), risk factor 
disclosures indicating disapproval of the New York court’s decision (Risk Factor), and inserting 
a Limit to External Indebtedness clause. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
We see in Table 8 that of the 24 sovereigns that effected a Major change away from the 
risky version of the clause, 22 (or 92%) also took additional steps to further narrow the scope of 
the clause (Limit on Understanding), report their disapproval of the NML decisions via a risk 
factor disclosure, or insert a Limit to External Indebtedness. These additional revisions, over and 
above the Major change pushed by the IMF, all point in the same anti-holdout risk direction and  
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suggest that IMF pressure was not driving the anti-holdout changes to the core of the clause. 
 
5. Analysis of Sovereigns Without a Prior History 
 As a supplementary test of the importance of inertia costs and the Random Mutation 
model, we focus on those countries without a sovereign bond offering in the period from January 
1, 2006 to June 1, 2011 (No History Sovereigns).  We posit that the No History Sovereigns face 
lower inertia costs compared with sovereigns with a history of prior pari passu usage.  The 
rationale here, drawn from interviews with practitioners, is that sovereigns with large outstanding 
debt stocks might be concerned that revisions could lead a court to draw a negative inference 
about the meaning of the clauses in the old bonds (Gulati & Scott 2013).  We compare the 
distribution of types of pari passu clauses for both groups of sovereigns in the Early Period when 
inertia costs were relatively high.  We also compare the two groups in the Late Period when 
inertia costs are lower. If the inertia costs of this debt overhang are important, we should observe 
differences in the distribution of clauses for the two groups in the Early Period but fewer 
differences in the Late Period.  The results of our comparisons are reported in Table 9 in Panel A 
(Early Period) and Panel B (Late Period). 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 Panel A of Table 9 reports that No History Sovereigns are more likely to draft pari passu 
terms with a lower risk of holdouts as compared to History Sovereigns.  In particular No History 
Sovereigns never employ the high risk Pay Equally version of pari passu.  Only 13.5% of the No 
History Sovereigns use the Rank Equally in Payment clause; in comparison, 32.9% of the 
History Sovereigns have the Rank Equally in Payment clause.  The difference in the distribution 
of pari passu clauses for the No History and History sovereigns in the Early Period is significant 
at the 5% level.  This is consistent with inertia costs affecting those sovereigns with an existing 
stock of bonds more than those without it. 
 
 It is possible, however, that the sovereigns in the No History category differ from the 
sovereigns in the History category in the type of pari passu clause that the sovereigns prefer.  To 
the extent No History sovereigns pose less risk of sovereign opportunism, there is less need to 
increase the cost of restructuring to deter such opportunism.  If this is the case, No History 
sovereigns may prefer a pari passu clause that offers only a low risk of holdouts.  The pattern we 
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observe in Panel A of Table 9 for the Early Period, therefore, may reflect Rational Design rather 
than reduced inertia costs affecting the No History Sovereigns.  As a threshold matter, this story 
is implausible on its face, given that the No History sovereigns are almost all new entrants to the 
markets (countries like Mongolia, Ethiopia and Rwanda).  Thus, creditors should expect more 
opportunism with these countries (and higher risk pari passu clauses), not less opportunism and 
lower risk clauses (and we see lower risk clauses).  Regardless, there is a way to test this 
question further. 
 
If Rational Design explains the pattern in Panel A then we expect that this pattern will 
persist in the Late Period.  However, Panel B of Table 9 reports that the Rank Equally in 
Payment version of the pari passu clause becomes dominant for both No History and History 
Sovereigns in the Late Period.  Moreover, the difference in the distributions for the No History 
and History sovereigns that was significant in the Early Period is no longer statistically 
significant in the Late Period.  This is consistent with lower inertia costs for all sovereigns in the 
Late Period and the movement to one market standard—the Rank Equally term—is consistent 
with the Random Mutation model.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Traditional contract doctrine treats commercial contract terms as embodying a bargain 
among sophisticated parties.  Parties are assumed to use precise language in their contracts 
because they want courts and counterparts to understand fully the combinations of underlying 
substantive rights that form the basis for mutually beneficial trade.  The implication of this model 
is that, other things equal, courts are instructed to give meaning to differences in the language of 
contracts that reflects the parties ex ante intentions. Reality, in the portion of the world of 
boilerplate contracts we have examined, appears to be different. Even sophisticated contracting 
parties do not tailor standardized contracts to articulate precisely their particular needs, 
expectations and understandings. Instead, agents with imperfect knowledge of the purposes that 
support the boilerplate terms, copy the standard forms, making minor modifications at the 
margins to meet their clients’ objectives as they understand them.  The result is that contract 
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clauses that no one understands can become part of the standard template, and variations among 
these clauses that are largely meaningless can arise and even grow in usage. 
 
A fair question to ask though is whether our one example of the pari passu clause 
idiosyncratic? We have been asked, for example, whether the different versions of pari passu 
would have been recognized by most judges as the equivalent of saying “we will treat you all 
fairly” and that the judges in New York in the NML case just got this case wrong by attaching 
importance to the word “payment”.  We cannot reject this possibility, but a different aspect of 
these same clauses in this very context may shed some light on the matter.  And that is the 
variation in the scope of these clauses.  As noted earlier, every pari passu clause comes with a 
defined scope. That is, it might apply narrowly, to just the sovereign issuer’s “external debt” 
(defined as its exchange-listed foreign currency obligations), or broadly to all the issuer’s 
“indebtedness” (which would include loans and domestic debt, in addition to the foreign debt) or 
still more broadly to all the issuer’s “obligations” (which might include, in addition to all the 
debt, things like pension obligations of the state, salary payments, etc.).  Few would argue, we 
suspect, that there are not well recognized differences between say “external indebtedness” and 
“indebtedness”.  Yet, what we saw with the revisions to the pari passu clause that occurred after 
October 2014 was that not only did all the different versions of the main clause get revised to the 
original “rank equally” version, but that these variations in scope also got revised to a single 
version (the original and narrowest formulation, which was “external indebtedness”). 
 
More broadly, in the context of the multi-trillion sovereign debt market itself (in part 
because of the interest generated by the NML decisions), scholars have suggested that 
considerable variation in phrasing exists in a number other key terms as well, such as the waivers 
of immunity from enforcement and cross-default clauses (Weidemaier 2013; Olivares-Caminal 
2017).  It remains to be seen, however, whether those variations are the product of rational 
design or random mutation.  Our theoretical premise is that the ways in which boilerplate evolves 
over time—with terms become rote and encrusted—suggests that pari passu is not an isolated 
case.  But good empirical evidence on the nature and evolution of boilerplate contracts is only 
beginning to be produced. This paper, we hope,  paves the way for further explorations of 
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contractual black holes –their existence and their effects—in other markets where standardized 
boilerplate is ubiquitous. 
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Table 4: Incidence of Pari Passu Clauses by Sovereigns  
 
 
Mandatory 
Law 
Rank 
Equally 
Rank 
Equally in 
Payment Pay Equally All 
2011 25 12 16 0 53 
 47.2% 22.6% 30.2% 0.0% 100.0% 
      
2012 63 34 33 3 133 
 47.4% 25.6% 24.8% 2.3% 100.0% 
      
2013 62 23 45 1 131 
 47.3% 17.6% 34.4% 0.8% 100.0% 
      
2014 54 34 41 2 131 
 41.2% 26.0% 31.3% 1.5% 100.0% 
      
2015 39 58 25 0 122 
 32.0% 47.5% 20.5% 0.0% 100.0% 
      
2016 26 84 10 1 121 
 21.5% 69.4% 8.3% 0.8% 100.0% 
      
Total 269 245 170 7 691 
 38.9% 35.5% 24.6% 1.0% 100.0% 
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Table 5: Early Period Shifts by Sovereign Issuers 
 
Major Shifts     
 Mandatory 
Law Rank Equally 
Rank Equally 
in Payment Pay Equally 
Language  0 0 3 1 
Shift 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 50.0% 
         
Mandatory Law 0 0 0 0 
Shift 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
     
Evidentiary Shifts     
 Mandatory 
Law Rank Equally 
Rank Equally 
in Payment Pay Equally 
Risk Factor 1 1 5 0 
Shift 5.6% 5.9% 23.8% 0.0% 
         
Understanding 2 3 4 0 
Shift 11.1% 17.7% 19.1% 0.0% 
         
Total (Either Major 2 3 8 1 
or Evidentiary Shift) 11.1% 17.7% 38.1% 50.0% 
Percentages are computed as a percentage of the total number of sovereign bond issuances in each particular 
category (Mandatory Law, Rank Equally, Rank Equally in Payment, and Pay Equally categories). 
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Table 6: Early Period Hazard Model for Evidentiary Shifts 
 
 (1) 
Evidentiary Shift 
(2) 
Evidentiary Shift 
(3) 
Evidentiary Shift 
Ln(Offer Amount) 1.030 1.140 0.913 
 (0.20) (0.80) (-0.57) 
    
Investment Grade 0.262+ 0.334 0.205 
 (-1.65) (-1.30) (-1.58) 
    
Top Issuer Counsel 6.311* 6.320* 1.715 
 (2.16) (2.09) (0.44) 
    
Top UW Counsel 0.706 0.641 5.086+ 
 (-0.55) (-0.69) (1.66) 
    
Rank Equally 1.606 3.069 1.738 
in Payment (0.75) (1.45) (0.81) 
    
Recent Default  11.54*  
  (2.08)  
    
Latin America   35.50** 
   (3.14) 
N 248 248 248 
pseudo R2 0.186 0.240 0.377 
ll -30.28 -28.28 -23.18 
Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  
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Table 7: Late Period Pari Passu Clause Changes 
 
Major Shift     
 
Mandatory Law Rank Equally 
Rank Equally in 
Payment Pay Equally 
Language  5 0 10 0 
Shift 23.8% 0.0% 45.5% 0.0% 
     
Mandatory 12 2 0 0 
Shift 57.1% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
         
Evidentiary Shift     
 
Mandatory Law Rank Equally 
Rank Equally in 
Payment Pay Equally 
Risk Factor 3 4 3 0 
Shift 14.3% 20.0% 13.6% 0.0% 
     
Understanding 12 12 10 0 
Shift 57.1% 60.0% 45.5% 0.0% 
         
Other Shift     
 
Mandatory Law Rank Equally 
Rank Equally in 
Payment Pay Equally 
Limit Change 9 2 0 0 
 42.9% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
         
Total (Any Shift) 15 11 8 0 
 71.4% 55.0% 36.4% 0.0% 
Percentages are computed as a percentage of the total number of sovereign bond issuances in each particular 
category (Mandatory Law, Rank Equally, Rank Equally in Payment, and Pay Equally categories). 
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Table 8: Late Period Mitigating Clauses in the Same Contract with a Major Shift for 
Sovereign Issuers for Sovereigns that Did Not Initially Start with the Low Risk Version of 
the Pari Passu Clause 
 
Sovereign Issue Date Risk Factor Understanding Limit on 
External 
Indebtedness 
Any of the 
Mitigating 
Clauses 
Lithuania 10/21/14 0 1 1 1 
Mexico 11/26/14 0 1 1 1 
Chile 12/12/14 0 1 1 1 
Turkey 1/13/15 1 1 1 1 
Colombia 1/28/15 0 0 1 1 
Dominican Republic 2/5/15 0 1 1 1 
Costa Rica 3/5/15 0 1 1 1 
Croatia 3/9/15 0 1 0 1 
Montenegro 3/13/15 1 1 0 1 
Armenia 3/24/15 1 1 0 1 
Gabon 6/12/15 0 1 1 1 
Mongolia 6/19/15 0 1 1 1 
Zambia 7/28/15 0 1 1 1 
Israel 9/10/15 0 1 1 1 
Brazil 9/26/15 1 1 1 1 
Ukraine 9/26/15 0 1 1 1 
Namibia 10/27/15 0 1 1 1 
Jordan 11/4/15 1 1 1 1 
Albania 11/20/15 0 1 1 1 
Hungary 4/14/16 0 0 0 0 
Abu Dhabi 5/3/16 0 1 0 1 
China 5/27/16 0 1 1 1 
Romania 10/3/16 0 1 1 1 
Poland 12/16/16 0 0 0 0 
* Includes only sovereigns that were not Low Risk issuers prior to the beginning of the dataset 
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Table 9 
 
Panel A:  Early Period 
 
 No History 
Sovereigns 
History 
Sovereigns 
Mandatory Law 28 171 
 53.90% 45.70% 
   
Rank Equally 17 74 
 32.70% 19.80% 
   
Rank Equally in  7 123 
Payment 13.50% 32.90% 
   
Pay Equally 0 6 
 0.00% 1.60% 
   
Total 52 374 
 100.00% 100.00% 
Pearson chi2(3) = 10.6847   Prob. = 0.014 
 
 
Panel B:  Late Period 
 
 No History 
Sovereigns 
History 
Sovereigns 
Mandatory Law 12 58 
 24.0% 27.0% 
   
Rank Equally 29 125 
 58.0% 58.1% 
   
Rank Equally in  9 31 
Payment 18.0% 14.4% 
   
Pay Equally 0 1 
 0.0% 0.5% 
   
Total 50 215 
 100.0% 100.0% 
Pearson chi2(3) =   0.7135   Prob. = 0.870 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Sovereign Issuances Under Foreign Law by Year
with Specific Type of Pari Passu Clause
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Figure 2:  Percent of Sovereign Issuances under Foreign Law with Major Change
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Figure 3:  Percent of  Sovereign Issuances under Foreign Law with Evidentiary Change
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